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BEWARE OF WOODEN NICKELS: THE PARADOX
OF FLORIDA’S LEGISLATIVE OVERREACTION IN
THE WAKE OF KELO
Ann Marie Cavazos*
This article addresses Florida’s reaction to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London. In Kelo, the Court provided
a more expansive view of “the public use” of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause to include taking property from one private owner and transferring
it to a corporation or non-private citizen when the transfer is deemed by
the lawmakers to be in the public good or for a public purpose.
Florida, together with several other states, concluded that such
eminent domain takings, while constitutionally permissible, offend the
states’ sense of fair play as it relates to private homeowners’ property
rights. Several states sought legislative solutions to ameliorate the Court’s
decision. The most reactive solution to date was enacted by the Florida
legislature.
The Florida statutory amendments cured the pernicious act of
governmental taking of private property from one citizen and conveying it
to another who promises to make “better use” of the property by
specifically prohibiting it; however, this flat prohibition on economic
development or blight condemnation eliminated a legitimate municipal tool
serving all residents, albeit at the expense of a few affected homeowners.
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Consequently, the amendments may have unintended side effects which are
worse than the ill they purported to cure.
This article also examines the negative impact of these amendments
on counties, towns, and municipalities which have traditionally relied on
lawful takings to modernize their urban areas, attract financing and
industry, and increase their tax bases. After Kelo, Florida hoped to be a
model of legislative responsibility; however, upon further analysis,
Florida’s reaction might prove to be premature and counterproductive.
In short, the rush to enact laws to protect homeowners from the
holding in Kelo has resulted in potentially more harm than intended and is
a “Pyrrhic” victory at best.
“There is surely nothing so useless as doing with great efficiency what
should not be done at all.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New
London, allowed a municipality to take property for just compensation for
the public purpose of economic development.2 The 5-4 decision caused
uproar among private property advocates nationwide.3 The fear that
1. PETER F. DRUCKER, CLASSIC DRUCKER: ESSENTIAL WISDOM OF PETER DRUCKER
PAGES OF HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 83 (Thomas A. Stewart ed., Harvard
Business Press 2006).
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489−90 (2005) (emphasizing that the
Court‟s authority extends only to determining whether the City‟s proposed condemnations
are for a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution through interpretation of a century of case law). The author of this article
recognizes that this area of the law has many issues. Certainly, those on the lower socioeconomic ladder are the ones most harmed by eminent domain takings. It is not the intent of
this article to address that aspect; rather, the focus is on restrictive legislation and its effect
on local government. For further discussion on the impact of eminent domain takings on the
poor, see George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got to Do With
It?, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803 (2007-2008); Tom I. Romero, II, Kelo, Parents and
The Spatialization of Color (Blindness) in the Berman-Brown Metropolitan Heterotopia,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 947 (2008); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN
CITIES (1993); Pat Beall, Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Case Draws National Spotlight,
PALM
BEACH
POST,
Dec.
11,
2005,
http//www.palmbeachpost.com/localnews/content/local_news/epaper/2005/12/11/c1a_blight
_1211.html.
3. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 458 (holding that the city‟s condemnation of private property
met the “public use” test of the Fifth Amendment, where the property was thereafter to be
handed over to Pfizer for the construction of its research and development headquarters).
Pfizer has since decided to close its research and development headquarters in New London,
Connecticut. The City spent $78 million bulldozing the condemned properties and failed to
realize its initial goals of producing tax benefits and creating jobs. Unfortunately, the land
remains vacant. See Editorial, Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at
FROM THE
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money-minded municipalities would conspire with greedy developers to
take desirable, as well as undesirable, property from individual
homeowners and convert it to the developers‟ own profitable use was more
than some state legislatures, and their constituents, could endure.4
Lawmakers in many states rushed to pass restrictive legislation to
ameliorate the perceived “evils” of Kelo.5 New legislation focused on
narrowing the definition of “public purpose,” a key phrase in eminent
domain law.
This article explores the evolution of the definition of “public
purpose” and the unintended consequences of legislative reactions to the
Kelo decision. Part II discusses the Kelo decision and its precedent. Part
III examines legislative reactions to Kelo across the nation. Part IV offers a
case-study focusing on Florida‟s legislative reaction, an example of a hasty
legislative reaction which may have the unintended consequence of
unnecessarily restricting local governments‟ ability to redevelop blighted
communities for the public health, public safety, morals, peace, and
welfare.6 Part V explores the unintended consequences of Florida‟s
reaction to Kelo. Part VI discusses an alternative to Florida‟s approach that
protects individual property rights and prevents developer abuses without
unduly restricting local governments‟ ability to improve economic
conditions for all residents.
II.

EMINENT DOMAIN: KELO AND ITS PRECEDENT

Eminent domain is, generally speaking, the term given to actions of a
municipal, county, state, or federal government taking private property for
a public use without the owner‟s consent.7 It is an inherent sovereign
power of the government.8 The last clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides the Constitutional basis for governmental restraint on eminent
domain actions.9 More commonly referred to as the Takings Clause,10 the
A20 (discussing the aftermath of Kelo).
4. Fred Lucas, Eminent Domain Outcry Pierces Statehouses, STATELINE.ORG (Mar. 16,
2008), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=96421.
5. See Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, supra note 3 (reporting voter concern over the
once-forgotten government power of eminent domain); see also Tresa Baldas, States Ride
Post-Kelo
Wave
of
Legislation,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
2,
2005),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005544647
(stating
that
lawmakers in 28 states have introduced more than 70 post-Kelo bills).
6. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
7. BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009).
8. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep‟t, 170 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 1964).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring that the property be taken for “public use” and
the owner be given “just compensation”).
10. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”
Id. This clause provides the greatest amount of economic justice to individuals. It should
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Just Compensation Clause,11 or the Public Use Clause,12 this section
prohibits taking private property for public use without just
compensation.13 Although the Takings Clause specifically limits only
federal actions, courts apply the restraints to the states though the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14
The Fifth Amendment imposes two limitations or restrictions on the
power of eminent domain. First, the government can take private property
only if it provides “just compensation” to the owner,15 and second, the
property taken must be for public use.16 These two limitations, in theory
together, safeguard property owners against excessive, unpredictable, and
unfair use of the government‟s eminent domain power.17 States enact
legislation within these limitations, and local governments must, in turn,
comply with the state law when exercising eminent domain power. When
local action is challenged, the reviewing court will consider whether the
exercise of eminent domain power was rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose and whether the legislature might reasonably consider the

be noted that the Takings Clause comes from the Magna Carta and the founding fathers
thought it essential to include it in the Constitution. William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782
(1995) (discussing the history of the Takings Clause).
11. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‟l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
307 (2002).
12. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, ratified July 9 1968, provides that “[n]o state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” For a discussion of how the concerns raised by the Thirteenth Amendment manifest
themselves in the context of takings cases, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
504 (2005), Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906), and
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Justice
Stevens, in the Kelo opinion, cites Strickley, among others, as precedent for the U.S.
Supreme Court‟s use of the broader “public purpose” test, as opposed to the narrow “use by
the public” test. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80.
15. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 307 n.1.
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. And “just compensation” means the full
monetary equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same
position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken. In enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date
adopted the concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking.
U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970).
16. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 496 (O‟Conner, J., dissenting).
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use public.18
In Kelo, the City of New London (“City” or “New London”) sought to
rejuvenate a waterfront section of the town that was designated as a
“distressed municipality.”19 Such rejuvenation would allow the City to
attract new industry, specifically Pfizer Corporation, which would create
jobs and increase tax revenue.20 To reach this goal, the City designated the
New London Development Corporation (NLDC) to spearhead
redevelopment efforts.21 The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase
of the majority of the parcels of land within the targeted redevelopment
area, but a minority of property owners refused to sell their property. 22 In
response to the holdout property owners, the NLDC instituted
condemnation proceedings.23 The owners of the condemned property filed
suit, and the case eventually worked its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.24
At issue was whether the City‟s decision, pursuant to a Connecticut state
statute, to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfied
the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.25 The statute
expressed “a legislative determination that the taking of land, even
developed land, as part of an economic development project [was] a „public
use‟ and in the „public interest.‟”26 The Kelo court examined the
Connecticut statute27 and concluded that a fair interpretation of the term
18. Id. at 476.
19. Id. at 473.
20. Id. at 495.
21. Id. at 473.
22. Id. at 472.
23. Id. at 473.
24. Originating in the New London Superior Court of Connecticut in 2000, a permanent
restraining order prohibiting the taking of some of the properties was granted, but relief was
denied as to other properties. Kelo v. City of New London, No. KNL-CV-01-0557299-S,
2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 13, 2002). On appeal in 2004, the Connecticut
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the “economic
development” in question qualified as a valid public use under federal and state law and all
of the City‟s proposed takings were valid. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500
(Conn. 2004). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, rendering its
decision in 2005. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). A rehearing was
denied later that same year. Id. at 1158.
25. Id. at 477.
26. Id. at 476.
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2011). The Connecticut statute expressing that an
economic development project is in the “public use” states:
It is found and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon the
continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acquisition
and improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commercial
plants to meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance with
local, regional and state planning objectives; that such acquisition and
improvement often cannot be accomplished through the ordinary operations of
private enterprise at competitive rates of progress and economies of cost; that
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“public use” would encompass economic development, even if such
development occurred at the hands of a private developer.28
New London defended its conduct by asserting that taking private
property for economic development, even when such development would
be executed by a private developer, rather than directly by the government,
served a public purpose because the resulting economic benefits, in the
form of jobs and tax revenue, would inure to the benefit of all citizens of
New London, including the displaced homeowners.29 Agreeing with the
City‟s rationale, the Court found that the potential increase in local tax
revenues by the ultimate redevelopment of the condemned property
satisfied the public use prerequisite of the Fifth Amendment.30
The Kelo majority clarified that taking property for a “public purpose”
qualified as a permissible “public use,” pursuant to the Fifth Amendment,31
despite the fact that the taken property would not be open to the general
public.32 This holding, expanding precedent, was instituted at the close of
the nineteenth century; a time when the Supreme Court applied the Fifth
Amendment to the States and embraced a broader interpretation of public
use as an equivalent to public purpose.33 In 1954, the Court‟s holding in
Berman v. Parker34 gave broad deference to the state legislatures to define
public purpose by allowing the District of Columbia to condemn property,
not only if an area was slum or blighted, but also for prevention of future
blight that would injure the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.35
Provided the taking was within the State‟s definition of public purpose, the
Court found it of no consequence that: (1) some of the property within the
designated blighted area was non-blighted, or commercial property, and (2)
portions of the land acquired through eminent domain could be sold or
leased to private interests.36 It concluded:

permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and
water areas and to acquire and improve or demolish vacated commercial plants
for industrial and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities, to lend
funds to businesses and industries within a project area in accordance with such
planning objectives are public uses and purposes for which public moneys may
be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of
this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.
Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
Id. at 490.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 480.
348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31, 35.
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Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment which,
standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending. But we have
said enough to indicate that it is the need of the area as a whole
which Congress and its agencies are evaluating. If owner after
owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on
the ground that his particular property was not being used against
the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would
suffer greatly. The argument pressed on us is, indeed, a plea to
substitute the landowner‟s standard of the public need for the
standard prescribed by Congress. But as we have already stated,
community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the
Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by
building. . . . If the Agency considers it necessary in carrying out
the redevelopment project to take full title to the real property
involved, it may do so. It is not for the courts to determine
whether it is necessary for successful consummation of the
project that unsafe, unsightly, or insanitary buildings alone be
taken or whether title to the land be included, any more than it is
the function of the courts to sort and choose among the various
parcels selected for condemnation. The rights of these property
owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation
which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.37
Further, in 1984, in the next well-publicized and sweeping eminentdomain case, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,38 the Court permitted
local government, acting within the statutory definition of public use, to
transfer ownership from one private individual to another through eminent
domain. The Court considered whether the Public Use Clause permitted
the State of Hawaii to take, with just compensation, title in real property
from one class of private individuals (lessors), and transfer it to another
(lessees). This was done for a stated public purpose of reducing the
concentration of fee simple ownership in the State, where fewer than
seventy-two individuals owned nearly fifty percent of the land.39 Holding
that the “public use” requirement was coterminous with the scope of the
state‟s police powers, the majority, led by Justice Sandra Day O‟Connor,
expounded that so long as the eminent domain power was rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose, courts must not find a compensated taking

37. Id. at 35-36.
38. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
39. Id. at 231−32. An oligopoly existed within Hawaii, where fewer than 75
individuals owned nearly fifty percent of the land. The Hawaii legislature enacted the Land
Reform Act of 1967 to address the concentration of land ownership that was responsible for
skewing the state‟s residential fee simple market. The legislature believed that such
concentration was inflating land prices and injuring the public tranquility and welfare. Id. at
232.

CAVAZOSFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE)

692

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

4/28/2011 7:34 PM

[Vol. 13:3

to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause,40 even when the government
does not intend to use the property itself.41
The rationale utilized in the Berman and Midkiff decisions paved the
way for the Kelo Court to acquiesce to the Connecticut State Legislature‟s
broadly defined “public use” so long as the exercise of eminent domain
power to take property from a private individual rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose.42 In Kelo, the City acted pursuant to a state
statute that authorized the use of eminent domain to redevelop a distressed
area as part of a redevelopment plan.43 Despite the fact that non-blighted
parcels located within the blighted area were transferred to a private party,
the Court found the taking to be valid because the public at large benefited
from the redevelopment, potential increase in local jobs, and tax revenues
offered by the local government‟s rejuvenation plan, thus presenting an
acceptable public use in accordance with state and federal law.44
While Justice Kennedy cautioned against permitting condemnation
undertaken as a result of “impermissible favoritism” toward a private
party,45 Justice O‟Connor issued a dissent in which she chided the Supreme
Court‟s failure to determine explicit limitations on how far municipal
takings extend.46 O‟Connor stated:
Under the banner of economic development, all private property
is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an
owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public—in the process.47
Even though the transfer of property in Berman and Midkiff was also
private to private, Justice O‟Connor explained that those takings differed
from Kelo because the legislative entity mitigated harm by removing or
redistributing property use.48 In Berman and Midkiff, the takings were
consistent with the Public Use Clause because “the extraordinary,
precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on
society—in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in
Midkiff through oligopoly49 resulting from extreme wealth.”50 Expressing
40. Id. at 240−41.
41. Id. at 243−44. “The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain and
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as
having only a private purpose.” Id.
42. Id. at 241.
43. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
44. Id. at 483.
45. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 494 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 500.
49. According to Black‟s Law Dictionary, “oligopoly” is defined as follows: “Control
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grave concern that Kelo expanded the meaning of “public use” beyond
traditional “harm on society” condemnation as in Berman and Midkiff,
O‟Connor asserted,
[i]t holds that the sovereign may take private property currently
put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary
private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some
secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue,
more jobs, or maybe even aesthetic pleasure.51
O‟Connor‟s dissent was a rallying cry to private property rights
advocates across the nation.52 However, this author opines that Kelo, like
Berman and Midkiff, was predicated on a public use redevelopment plan
designed to eradicate “harm on society.” The transfer of property was also
private to private. For that reason, O‟Connor‟s dissent in Kelo was
contradictory to her majority opinion in Midkiff.
The cornerstone in each of the takings cases, Berman, Midkiff, and
Kelo, is the Supreme Court‟s deference to Congress and state legislatures.53
The Court consistently ruled that, so long as the legislation can reasonably
identify an evil that they are attempting to address, a public purpose will be
found, and therefore the statute and the actions taken pursuant to it will
pass constitutional muster.54 Citing Midkiff, the Court reiterated in Kelo
that “[w]hen the legislature‟s purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of
takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal
courts.”55
The dissenters offered a narrow test requiring “clear and convincing
evidence” to show that the proposed economic benefit would, with
reasonable certainty, come to pass.56 However, the majority was reluctant
to adopt the proposal, concerned that such a test would impose “a

or domination of a market by a few large sellers, creating high prices and low output similar
to those found in a monopoly.” BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (8th ed. 2004).
50. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 501.
52. See id. at 494 (citing the Bill of Rights to emphasize the importance of freedom
from governmental interference with regards to personal property).
53. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984) (“Subject to
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary,
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be
Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia . . . or the States legislating
concerning local affairs.”)
54. Id. at 245.
55. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43).
56. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting).
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„heightened‟ standard of judicial review for takings justified by economic
development” and represent a greater departure from precedent.57 The
Court emphasized that “[a] constitutional rule that required postponement
of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of
success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a
significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such
plans.”58 After considering the consequences, the Court again chose to
defer to state legislatures to define public use and leave to the courts the
question of whether the government‟s purpose in taking the property is
rationally related to a public use.59
It further reminded the dissenters that the doctrines of state
sovereignty and states‟ rights would allow legislatures to determine
whether to impose tighter restrictions on economic development despite the
majority‟s ruling: 60
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power. Indeed, many States already impose “public use”
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of
these requirements have been established as a matter of state
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which
takings may be exercised.61
Thus, it is incumbent on state legislatures to carefully consider their
definition of “public purpose” or “public use” and to strive to achieve
balance between the rights of private property owners and the needs of
counties and municipalities to maintain local vitality and viability.
57. Id. at 477.
58. Id. at 488.
59. Id.
60. The deference is expressed in the doctrine of “the adequate and independent state
ground,” which was addressed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it
will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent
state grounds. The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to
warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and
federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only
power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to
revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its view
of federal law, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion.
TALBOT D‟ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 18 (1991).
61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
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III. REACTION TO KELO
With some exceptions, the reaction to Kelo was uniformly negative as
naysayers opined that local governments would run amok with speculative
redevelopment plans.62 For example, elected officials and the general
populace widely condemned the decision as an unprecedented expansion of
local government power to seize private property for dubious purposes.63
Attorneys representing property owners were outraged that the government
could take one person‟s property and give it to another in the name of
economic development, which is not in line with the well-established
American principles of private ownership.64 On the other hand, “attorneys
representing municipalities and private developers in eminent domain cases
hailed the high Court‟s ruling, maintaining that eminent domain is essential
to economic development, and that critics of the ruling are overreacting.”65
Meanwhile, during the last four years, scholars, distinguished professors,
and newspapers have written extensively on post-Kelo reforms,66 and
joining the discussion are commentators, property rights advocates,
attorneys, and politicians on the need to protect property owners from
Kelo-type takings.67 The literature ranges from warnings of the possible
62. David A. Dana, Colloquoy, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning The
Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2007).
63. John D. Echeverria, The Myth That Kelo Has Expanded the Scope of Eminent
Domain, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL‟Y INST. (July 20, 2005),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/documents/KeloMyth.pdf.
64. Steven Seidenberg, Where’s the Revolution?, 95 A.B.A. J. 50 (April 2009),
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/wheres_the_revolution. “Drastic
Changes in land use law were predicted after the U.S. Supreme Court‟s Kelo ruling, but four
years later, things don‟t look that different.” Id.
65. Baldas, supra note 5.
66. The following are examples of pieces discussing post-Kelo reforms: DANA
BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 52 (2003); DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE
FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN THE POST-KELO WORLD (2006); Errol E.
Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1
(1980); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL‟Y REV. 1 (2003); Ilya Somin, The
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2136
(2009); Carrie Johnson, Property Ruling Appalls Officials, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 25,
2005, at 1B; Les Christie, Kelo’s Revenge: Voters Restrict Eminent Domain,
CNNMONEY.COM,
Nov.
8,
2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/08/real_estate/kelos_revenge/ (reporting that 69% of Florida
voters passed the amendment).
67. Baldas, supra note 5.
Legislators in Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, New Jersey and Michigan are
mobilizing to support state constitutional amendments prohibiting eminent
domain for private development. In California, which has some of the strictest
proposed legislation, two bills would prohibit the exercise of eminent domain
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abuses evolving from the Kelo decision to precautions on legislatures
reacting too quickly.68
States were cautioned not to act too quickly in their haste to ease
constituents‟ concerns about Kelo.69 For example, Patricia Salkin, an
associate dean and director of the Government Law Center at Albany Law
School, warned that “quick reactions [to Kelo] can lead to ineffective
policy.”70 David Parkhurst, principal legislative counsel for the National
League of Cities, expressed, “it‟s good that Kelo has brought eminent
domain under the light of state examination. „As a state-derived power,
eminent domain is best handled at the state and local level.‟”71 Another
concern conveyed among those who took a neutral position on the eminent
domain question “is that fast-enacted legislation will be overly
restrictive.”72
Supporters of broad discretion in takings, such as Carolyn Coleman of
the National League of Cities, maintain that “eminent domain is a valuable
and constitutional economic development tool.”73
Many American
communities have been redeveloped under the taking power of eminent

for private use under any circumstances, while lawmakers in Texas, Minnesota,
Delaware and Connecticut would simply limit the use of eminent domain for
private projects or tighten eminent domain procedures.
Id.; see also Seidenberg, supra note 64 (discussing the current debate amongst
policymakers).
68. See Gary Boulard, Eminent domain--for the greater good? The U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Kelo v. New London has prompted states to look at their own eminent domain
practices,
THE
FREE
LIBRARY
BY
FARLEX
(January
1,
2006),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Eminent+domain-for+the+greater+good%3f+The+U.S.+Supreme+Court+decision...-a0140519588 (remarking
upon the debates currently going on within state legislatures as to eminent domain powers);
Elaine Misonzhnik , Panel Calls for Caution on Eminent Domain, THE FREE LIBRARY BY
FARLEX
(November
9,
2005),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Panel+calls+for+caution+on+eminent+domain.a0139211453 (cautioning that changes may soon come to eminent domain legislation, and
that therefore developers should be careful in assuming they now have a large advantage
due to Kelo).
69. Francesca Jarosz, Before You Grab That Property . . . States Take a Close Look at
Eminent Domain, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/bit/2007-01-02/jarosz.shtml.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Elizabeth N. Brown, States Fight to Limit Government’s Powers to Take Your
Home,
AARP
BULLETIN,
2
(May
12,
2008),
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/yourhome/articles/eminent_domain.html
(“Public
purchases of „blighted‟ property-through eminent domain or the prospect that it will be
invoked if homeowners refuse to sell-have been used successfully for decades to transform
neighborhoods into needed infrastructure or revitalized zones.”).
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domain.74 Social advocates stress that without this tool, economically
distressed communities will perish.75 Carla Main, a journalist and former
editor of The National Law Journal, emphasizes that “[e]minent domain is
an efficient and orderly way to clear large, contiguous parcels of land. It is
the only way to deal with the problem of holdouts. There is nothing to be
ashamed of in using eminent domain to improve communities.”76
Despite these calls for circumspection, many state legislatures quickly
passed statutes to ensure that nothing like Kelo would ever happen in their
states.77 Over 43 states78 passed legislation either restricting local
governments‟ use of eminent domain for economic development or blight
condemnation or redefining the term “blight.”79 Other reforms included
statutory or constitutional amendments.80 However, in Florida the reaction

74. Id.
75. Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Suit Dropped, ABC 25 WPBF, May 10, 2007,
http://www.wpbf.com/news/13297070/detail.html (discussing the suit); see also John
Kramer & Lisa Knepper, New Study Details Devastating Effects of Eminent Domain Abuse
on
African
Americans,
CASTLE
COALITION
(Feb.
14,
2007),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1786393/posts (discussing the issue).
76. Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 22,
2005), http://realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-10_21_05_CTM.html.
77. Echeverria, supra note 63.
78. Op-Ed, Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A20,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704402404574527513453636326.html.
79. Restricting Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Purposes, HOUSE RES. ORG.:
TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 3, 2007, at 5-6, available at
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int79-6.pdf (“Twenty-one [states] have restricted
the use of eminent domain for purposes of economic development, increasing tax revenue,
or transferring private property to a private entity. Ten states restrict the use of eminent
domain to „blighted‟ properties and place an emphasis on public health, safety, and welfare
criteria when designating blighted properties. A number of others have: adopted more
limited definitions of „public use‟; required certain actions during the process of exercising
eminent domain such as public notice, public hearings, and local government approval;
required compensation at greater than fair market value; placed a moratorium on eminent
domain for economic development; and established legislative committees to study the
issue.”); John E. Kramer, Special Interest Win, Property Owners Loses With Delaware
Governor’s Veto of Eminent Domain Reform, CASTLE COALITION (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://castlecoalition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=732; see also
CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM
LEGISLATION
SINCE
KELO
(June
2007),
available
at
www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf
[hereinafter
CASTLE COALITION] (developing a classification system to evaluate the effectiveness of
post-Kelo legislation reform on a state by state basis. For example, five states received a
passing grade of “A-”. They are Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South
Dakota.).
80. See Seidenberg, supra note 64 (“Drastic Changes in land use law were predicted
after the U.S. Supreme Court‟s Kelo ruling, but four years later, things don‟t look that
different.”).
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to Kelo was unwarranted.81 The Florida Constitution already afforded
private property owners protection from Kelo-type takings for
redevelopment and revitalization. The legislature nonetheless, in response
to Kelo-type takings, amended the statutes governing eminent domain.
Specifically, the legislature enacted sections 73.013−14, Florida
Statutes. Section 73.013 restricts the ability of condemning authorities to
transfer property acquired through eminent domain to private parties.
Section 73.014 declares the elimination of nuisance, slum or blight
conditions as a public purpose for which eminent domain may be used.
Florida‟s opinion of what constitutes a “public purpose” was more
restrictive than what the federal courts have determined satisfied the
“public use” requirement of the United States Constitution. Florida‟s
reaction—flatly
banning
economic
development82
or
blight
83
condemnation —should not be hailed as the model alternative to Kelo-type
takings. For instance, the Texas legislature‟s response was to simply limit
or eliminate the use of eminent domain as it relates to economic
redevelopment, “unless economic development is secondary to the main
objective of eliminating real blight.”84 Kelo reaffirms that the government
is not allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose
when the main purpose is to bestow a private benefit, which translates into
current legislations‟ ban on pretextual takings.85

81. The due process clause of the Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law” as worded in article I,
section 9. In addition, article X sections 6 (a) and (b) of the Florida Constitution provides
limitations on the power of the legislature to take property by eminent domain and requiring
it to be prescribed by law.
82. FLA. STAT. § 163.335(7) (2006).
It is further found and declared that the prevention or elimination of a slum area
or blighted area as defined in this part and the preservation or enhancement of
the tax base are not public uses or purposes for which private property may be
taken by eminent domain and do not satisfy the public purpose requirement of s.
6(a), Art. X of the State Constitution.
Id.,
available
at
http://archive.flsenate.gov/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=
&URL=Ch0163/SEC335.HTM&Title=->2006->Ch0163->Section%20335#0163.335.
83. FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (2006) (prohibiting the taking of private property “for the
purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions,” and therefore eliminating
nuisance, slum, and blight prevention as valid public purposes for the taking of private
property via eminent domain in Florida).
84. S.B.
7,
79th
Leg.,
2d
Sess.
(Tex.
2005),
available
at
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/792/billtext/html/SB00007F.htm; see also Press
Release, Office of the Governor Rick Perry, Gov. Perry Signs New Law Protecting Property
Rights (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/3239
(announcing Governor Perry‟s reasons for signing Senate Bill 7).
85. Somin, supra note 66, at 2136 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 US 469,
478 (2005)).
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It is important to look at the law in several states to achieve a
comprehensive picture.
In Alabama, the legislature enacted laws
prohibiting the use of eminent domain to transfer property from its original
owner to industrial, office, or residential developers, or retail
corporations.86 In Nevada, legislation restricts the use of eminent domain
by prohibiting agencies from using it for economic redevelopment
purposes, except where there is a finding of blight for each individual
parcel within the redevelopment area.87 Utah also prohibits local economic
redevelopment agencies from acquiring property by eminent domain.88
Colorado amended the public use definition to “not include the taking of
private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic
development or enhancement of tax revenue,” but still generally allows a
taking solely for the purpose of furthering a public use.89
In Iowa, legislation now requires a property-by-property assessment of
blight designation; only when 75 percent of the properties are blighted can
non-blighted properties be taken by eminent domain.90 This seems like a
fair rule, but it is easy to argue that a higher percentage requirement would
be better. I suggest that Florida should have redefined blight and
implemented a percentage designation like Iowa to determine when
properties can be taken by eminent domain. However, it needs to be
considered that some critics still find Iowa‟s reform ineffective because the
extensive definition of blight in Iowa‟s legislation depends on “the
definition of such terms as „deteriorated structures‟ and „excessive and
uncorrected deterioration of site.‟”91 Since, as a practical matter, Kelo
applies only where state legislatures subscribe to the same public use
definition employed by the Connecticut legislature, states such as Florida,
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, and Tennessee, which more narrowly
define the term, need not accept the broad finding of the Kelo Court.92
Instead, these states mandate that the public “directly” benefit from the
taking.93 This narrow test is difficult to administer, as noted by the Kelo
86. S.B.
68,
2005
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Ala.
2005),
available
at
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/Searchableinstruments/2005FS/Bills/SB68.htm.
87. S.B. 326, 2005 Leg., 73d Sess. (Nev. 2005),
available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/73rd/bills/SB/SB326_EN.pdf.
88. S.B. 184, 2005 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005), available at
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/bills/sbillenr/sb0184.htm.
89. CASTLE COALITION, supra note 79.
90. Id.
91. Somin, supra note 66, at 2130.
92. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (“When the Court began
applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as „public purpose.‟” (citing Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158−64 (1896))).
93. Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legislation, Is
The Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 420 (2007).
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Court, as it is unclear what proportion of the population needs to have
access to the property and at what price this is to be achieved.94 The
majority argued that the narrow use of the public test is “impractical given
the diverse and always evolving needs of society.”95 I opine that Florida‟s
response was hasty in comparison to other states‟ approaches to legislative
reform. Florida‟s decision appears to be reactive as opposed to responsive.
IV. A CASE STUDY: ENTHUSIASM RUN AMOK IN FLORIDA
Florida is a case study in irony. Before Kelo, the state broadly
supported the policy of taking private property for redeveloping localities
that were struggling economically in order to improve the public welfare
and increase the local tax base.96 However, after Kelo, and reacting to the
public outcry over takings of non-blighted properties for private economic
development, the federal government passed the “Private Property Rights
Protection Act of 2005.”97 The bill‟s sole purpose was to prevent a Kelo
94. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (2005).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 472.
97. H.R.
4128,
109th
Cong.
(1st
Sess.
2005),
available
at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/HR4128.pdf. The Private Property Rights Protection Act of
2005 (“PPRP”) prohibited the federal government from using the power of eminent domain
to take private property for economic development. Id. The PPRP also provided for the
withholding of federal economic development funds from state or local governments that do
so. Id. Section Two of the PPRP prohibits any state or political subdivision from exercising
its power of eminent domain for economic development if that state or political subdivision
receives federal economic development funds during the fiscal year. Id. This section
defines “economic development” as taking private property and conveying or leasing it to a
private entity for commercial enterprise carried on for profit or to increase tax revenue, the
tax base, employment, or general economic health. Id. The section also makes a state or
political subdivision that violates such prohibition ineligible for any such funds for two
fiscal years. Id. Further, it provides that such a state or political subdivision is not ineligible
for such funds if it returns all real property that was improperly taken and replaces or repairs
any property that was destroyed or damaged. Id. Section Three “[p]rohibits the federal
government from exercising its power of eminent domain for economic development.” Id.;
see
also
S.
1313,
109th
Cong.
(1st
Sess.
2005),
available
at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/S1313.pdf (proposing “[t]o protect homes, small businesses,
and other private property rights, by limiting the power of eminent domain”).; H.R. 3135,
109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/HR3135.pdf.
(proposing “[t]o protect private property rights”); H.R. 3405, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005),
available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/HR3405.pdf (proposing “[t]o prohibit the
provision of Federal economic development assistance for any State or locality that uses the
power of eminent domain power to obtain property for private commercial development or
that fails to pay relocation costs to persons displaced by use of the power of eminent domain
for economic development purposes”); The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes
and Other Private Property: Hearing on H.R. 4128 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
(2005)
(statement
of
Sen.
John
Cornyn),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1612&wit_id=4543 (discussing the
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situation, taking private property for economic development, from
occurring in the state or local government.98 Florida is the only state to
enact laws flatly rejecting condemnations based on “economic
development” and “blight” rationales.99 The Florida Constitution prohibits
takings of private property unless the taking is for a designated “public
purpose” and the property owner is paid full compensation.100 Over the
years, the definition of “public purpose” in Florida has been expanded
through case law. For example, in Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard
County, the Florida Supreme Court held that the power of eminent domain
should be limited to basic essentials like roads, schools, drainage projects,
parks, and playgrounds.101 In 1975, the Florida Supreme Court held in
Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority of Fort Lauderdale that
the “public interest must dominate the private gain” in order to acquire
property for the exercise of eminent domain.102 Continuing this trend, in

importance of Fifth Amendment rights and providing protection from taking by eminent
domain). Section Four of the PPRP created a new federal cause of action for any individual
suffering injury as a result of a violation of the Act, with a provision that allowed a
prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys‟ fees. Id.
98. H.R. 4128; S. 1313; H.R. 3135; H.R. 3405; see also The Kelo Decision:
Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing on H.R. 4128 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 97.
99. Dana, supra note 62, at 375. A blighted area is defined as “[a] declining area
suffering from seriously decreasing property values and not likely to recover without some
outside intervention. More than simply a market slip, a blighted area can be identified by
deteriorating buildings, increased crime rates, and decreased occupancies.” Blight Area,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/blighted+area
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011). Economic development is defined as efforts that seek to
improve the economic well-being and quality of life for a community by creating and/or
retaining jobs and supporting or growing incomes and the tax base.
Economic
Development,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/economic+development (last visited Feb. 16,
2011).
100. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (“No private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner secured by deposit in the
registry of the court and available to the owner.”). Florida courts have determined that “full
compensation” includes payment of the owner‟s attorney‟s fees and expert costs, so that he
or she is “made whole” after the taking. Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G.
DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1958). See also U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 1516 (1970) (“The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. And „just compensation‟ means the full monetary
equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as
he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. In enforcing the constitutional
mandate, the Court at an early date adopted the concept of market value: the owner is
entitled to the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking. But this basic
measurement of compensation has been hedged with certain refinements developed over the
years in the interest of effectuating the constitutional guarantee.”).
101. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard Cnty., 159 Fla. 311, 318 (Fla. 1947).
102. 315 So. 2d 451, 456 (Fla. 1975).
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the 1977 case of Deseret Ranches of Florida, Inc. v. Bowman, the Court
upheld a state statute that allowed a private party to use eminent domain to
obtain an easement of necessity over an adjacent property.103 The Court
concluded that the statute‟s purpose was predominantly public and any
benefit to the private party was very minor compared to the public
purpose.104 Then, in 1988, the Court broadened the application of the
public purpose doctrine even more in Department of Transportation v.
Fortune Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n.105 Here, the Court concluded that
“[t]he term „public purpose‟ does not mean simply that the land is used for
a specific public function” such as building roads.106 Public purpose
includes various projects that benefit the state in a “tangible, foreseeable
way.”107
Prior to Kelo, the Florida legislature did not expressly use the
terminology “economic development” as a pretext for public purpose in
eminent domain takings. However, the Florida Supreme Court addressed
economic development in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of Tampa,
where it acknowledged that mere economic redevelopment could not
justify the use of eminent domain and proposed a stricter standard.108 An
opinion by Justice Hobson eloquently concurs that “[t]he predominance of
esthetic considerations—cloaked in the guise of general welfare” —was
unconstitutional.109 The Court said that a “public benefit” is not
synonymous with “public purpose.”110
Although the public might
incidentally benefit from a redevelopment plan, there must be some
“reasonable necessity” for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.111
What remained undecided was whether economic development was
equivalent to public benefit, or fell somewhere along the spectrum towards
public purpose. The Florida Legislature decided to act.
In reaction to Kelo, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill 1567 to
apply to all eminent domain petitions filed after its effective date of May

103. 349 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1977).
104. Id. at 156.
105. Dep‟t of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‟n, 532 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1988).
106. Id. at 1270.
107. Id.
108. 115 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1959) (holding valid provisions that allow the clearance
and private redevelopment of “slum areas” where the redevelopment relates directly to the
public‟s health, safety, and welfare); see also Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Fort
Lauderdale, 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975) (noting that Grubstein validated
“condemnation of blighted or slum areas for public housing as a public purpose . . . based
upon proof that the area involved had become infested with crime and disease affecting the
public health and welfare, which, of course, is a proper public purpose . . . .”).
109. Grubstein, 115 So. 2d at 752 (Hobson, J., concurring specially).
110. Id. at 751.
111. Id.
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11, 2006.112 The new law amended Florida‟s eminent domain statute,
Chapter 73, Florida Statutes, by creating a new section prohibiting “the
transfer of property taken by use of eminent domain to a private person or
entity or a natural person.”113 Under the new law, the exercise of eminent
domain may only be used if it falls within the exception,114 which primarily
relates to governmental-type functions, such as common-carrier services or
systems, public infrastructure, public or private utilities for electrical
service, storm water or telephone services, along with several others.115
Chapter 73 also restricts takings for blight condemnation.116
A.

Pre-Kelo Eminent Domain and Community Redevelopment in Florida

Prior to Kelo, Florida‟s eminent domain statutes had a significant
impact on the development of its local communities.117 The Florida
Constitution and Florida Statutes did not explicitly prohibit the taking of
private property for the purpose of economic development, and the Florida
Supreme Court had not specifically ruled on using eminent domain to take

112. H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); see also H.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (proposing an amendment to the state Constitution to prohibit the
transfer of private property taken by eminent domain to a natural person or private entity;
provides that the Legislature may permit exceptions allowing the transfer of such private
property by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house).
113. FLA. STAT. §73.013(1) (2006).
114. FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2006).
115. H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); see also H.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (addressing governmental exceptions to eminent domain).
116.
73.014 Taking property to eliminate nuisance, slum, or blight conditions
prohibited.—
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision,
ordinance, statute, or special law, the state, any political subdivision as defined
in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power of eminent domain is
delegated may not exercise the power of eminent domain to take private
property for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision,
ordinance, statute, or special law, abating or eliminating a public nuisance is not
a valid public purpose or use for which private property may be taken by
eminent domain and does not satisfy the public purpose requirement of s. 6(a),
Art. X of the State Constitution. This subsection does not diminish the power of
counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or municipal ordinances
related to code enforcement or the elimination of public nuisances to the extent
such ordinances do not authorize the taking of private property by eminent
domain.
Fla. H.B. 1567(2).
117. See generally Community Redevelopment Act of 1969, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330163.463 (1969) (providing means by which slum and blighted areas can be revitalized).
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land from a private citizen and then transferring it to another private citizen
or entity.118 Before Kelo, redevelopment efforts in some states that
struggled economically were generally supported through taking property
in order to improve public welfare and to increase the local tax base.119
Prior to 2006, a valid taking in Florida required the condemning authority
to:
(1) Possess [the] authority to exercise . . . eminent domain;
(2) Demonstrate that a taking of private property is pursued for
a valid public purpose and that all statutory requirements
have been fulfilled;
(3) Offer evidence showing that the [under]taking is
reasonabl[y], [if not] absolutely, necessary to accomplish the
public purpose of the taking; and
(4) Pay the property owner full compensation as determined by
a [twelve]-member jury.120
These elements did not directly prohibit the taking of private property
for economic development purposes.121 Consequently, since the Florida
Constitution did not expressly authorize takings for economic development
purposes, the Community Redevelopment Act of 1969122 granted broad
“home rule”123 authority to cities and counties, including the authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain for any municipal or county
purpose.124 For example, the City of Tampa used the power of eminent
domain to acquire land to build parking garages in Ybor City.125 The City
of St. Petersburg exercised eminent domain to amass six blighted acres and

118. FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, HB 1567 EMINENT DOMAIN (2006), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1567b.JC.d
oc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1567&Session=2006.
119. See DARREN SPRINGER, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, STATE POLICY AND THE
EXERCISE
OF
THE
POWER
OF
EMINENT
DOMAIN,
available
at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/05StatePolicyEminent.pdf (discussing the changes various
states made to their standards for eminent domain after the Kelo decision).
120. FLA H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 118, at 5.
121. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-163.463 (2006).
122. Id.
123. See id. ch. 125 (relating to counties); id. ch. 166 (relating to municipalities); see
also id. ch. 163, pt. III (describing the purpose of “home rule” authority as providing local
government with self-governance to ensure that local issues and problems are handled at the
level of government closest to the citizens that they represent).
124. See id. ch. 125 (relating to counties); id. ch. 166 (relating to municipalities).
125. Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006,
at 1B, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2006/11/13/Tampabay/Crimping_eminent_doma.shtml.
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created BayWalk, a vibrant downtown shopping and entertainment area.126
Cities like Jacksonville and Tampa have significant redevelopment plans,
which have led to growth over the past few decades.127 The use of eminent
domain in these cases can be characterized as public purpose because the
city redeveloped land for the use of all citizens and visitors.
Nevertheless, many of the critics argue that eminent domain is a “root
of all evils” because the power of eminent domain was abused at times
throughout history.128 One such example occurred when the City of
Daytona Beach relied on a 24-year old blight finding to justify condemning
the bustling boardwalk businesses to enable a major facelift along the
beachside.129 In the five-year period of 1998−2002, “there were more than
10,000 actual and threatened condemnations for the benefit of private
parties around the nation.”130 Florida municipalities were responsible for
more than one-fifth of that total.”131 It is apparent that Florida was replete

126. Id.
127. See CRA Basics, FLA. REDEVELOPMENT ASS‟N, http://redevelopment.net/technicalassistance/q-a-for-cras/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (“The designation is used by Florida cities
of all sizes, from Jacksonville and Tampa to Madison and Apalachicola. Many familiar
locations, such as Church Street in Orlando, Ybor City in Tampa and the beachfront in Ft.
Lauderdale are successful examples of Community Redevelopment Areas.”).
128. Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, POL‟Y REV., Oct.-Nov. 2005,
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7292; see also
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)
(demonstrating effects of eminent domain); Elizabeth Nolan Brown, States Fight to Limit
Government’s Powers to Take Your Home, AARP BULLETIN, May 12, 2008,
http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/info-042009/eminent_domain.html (demonstrating examples of unpopular government usage of
eminent domain); U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN 3031 (2006), available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-28 (describing negative
effects of eminent domain).
129. In 2005, a Circuit Court Judge upheld the condemnations of three Floridian
properties, in Daytona Beach, as part of a project to replace one set of boardwalk businesses
for another. City of Daytona Beach v. Mathas, No. 2004-31846-CICI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19,
2005). Maybe a 24 year-old blight finding should be revised before any action is taken. See
Ludmilla Lelis, Daytona Businesses Must Sell Property, Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 20, 2005, at
A1; Ludmilla Lelis, Joyland Owners Settle with Daytona, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 2, 2004, at
B3.
130. Supreme Court’s Kelo Decision and Potential Congressional Responses: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 109th Cong.
109-60
at
25
(Sept.
22,
2005),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju23573.000/hju23573_0.HTM.
131. See Protecting Kelo’s Victims in Riviera Beach, Florida: City Seeks to Use Eminent
Domain to Replace Lower-Income & Minority Residents with Wealthier Ones, INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.ij.org/component/content/article/37-privatepropertyrights/965riviera-beach-florida-eminent-domain-background (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). This article
cites DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2, 52 (2003) available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED_report.pdf (noting 2,122 threatened and filed
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with Kelo-type policy takings, but those policies remained untested in
courts. As a result, Florida became among the worst abusers of eminent
domain in the nation.132
Notwithstanding what critics have stated, using eminent domain to
cure blight, on its face, is not an abuse of power. Economic development
has been considered a factor in the public context because the legislature
determined it to be a public purpose for which municipalities and counties
may expend public funds.133 Since the legislature declared economic
development as a public purpose for spending public funds, economic
development could conceivably have been considered a public purpose in
the context of the exercise of eminent domain power.134
Professor David Dana points out that, “[a]ll or virtually all
condemnations designated as blight condemnations could be characterized
as economic development condemnations, inasmuch as the end goal of
blight removal is economic redevelopment . . . .”135 The author‟s concern is
not with Florida critically evaluating each economic proposal, but rather
the summary fashion in which this legislation mandates rejection of all
proposals involving private development or use. Indeed, under this
legislation, property that has been previously condemned and taken by the
state could not be transferred to a private citizen for economic
development—even if the city has vacated the property—unless authorized
by general law and passed by three-fifths vote of each house of the
legislature. Needless to say, obtaining such approval from the legislature
could delay projects to the point of dissuading developers from pursuing
them.
In the wake of Kelo, the Florida Legislature echoed Justice
O‟Connor‟s fear and amended the state‟s eminent domain law by enacting
new provisions prohibiting the transfer to private parties of property taken
through eminent domain and eliminating the use of the power of eminent
domain to resolve cases of public nuisance, slum, or blight conditions.136
condemnations for private benefit between 1998 and 2002).
132. Gearing
Up
for
Battle,
CASTLE
COALITION,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=137&Itemid
=165 (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
133. FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 1567, EMINENT DOMAIN 9−10 (2006), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1567b.JC.d
oc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1567&Session=2006.
134. Id.
135. Dana, supra note 62, at 369.
136. FLA. STAT. § 70.013 (2006); see also H.R.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla
2006) (amending Florida Constitution by requiring “[p]rivate property taken by eminent
domain pursuant to a petition to initiate condemnation proceedings filed on or after January
2, 2007, may not be conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as provided by
general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the
Legislature.”).
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The new laws impact both substantive and procedural elements of Florida
eminent domain law.137
The key substantive and procedural component of section 73.013,
Florida Statutes, is that condemning authorities cannot take private
property unless it falls under one of the specific exceptions.138 After a
condemning authority holds title for ten years, it may, after issuing a notice
and allowing competitive bidding to take place, transfer the property to a
private entity.139 If certain requirements are met, the property can be
transferred in less than ten years.140
Further, Florida state legislators designed section 73.013 to limit
condemning authorities‟ exercise of eminent domain141 by placing specific
limitations on taking property and transferring it to private entities.142 The
rule further designates exceptions pursuant to which private property can
be taken and given to a private entity.143 The exceptions restrict local

137. Substantive components are those that determine rights and obligations, while
procedural components cover rules for governing the process for determining the rights.
138. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 3 (stating in F.S. § 73.014 that “[t]aking property to eliminate
nuisance, slum or blight conditions [is] prohibited”). Some of the exceptions include:
public carriers/systems, roads, public or private utilities (for specific listed purposes, i.e.
wastewater services), and providing public infrastructure.
139. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(a) (providing that if after at least ten years have elapsed
since the condemning authority acquired the property, then the property may be
subsequently transferred to another natural person or private entity without restriction
provided public notice and competitive bidding took place).
140. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(f)(1) (providing that: (1) the condemning authority or
governmental entity holding title to the property documents that the property is no longer
needed for the use or purpose for which it was acquired by the condemning authority or for
which it was transferred to the current titleholder; and (2) the owner from whom the
property was taken by eminent domain is given the opportunity to repurchase the property at
the price that he or she received from the condemning authority). These two provisions
explain that if the property is no longer needed for the use taken then the previous owner
can repurchase the property at the price s/he received. What about the cost to fix it up?
141. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 2 (stating in F.S. § 73.013 that “[c]onveyance of property taken
by eminent domain; preservation of government entity communications services eminent
domain limitation; exception to restrictions on power of eminent domain.—
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter
provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, if the state, any political
subdivision as defined in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power
of eminent domain is delegated files a petition of condemnation on or after
the effective date of this section regarding a parcel of real property in this
state, ownership or control of property acquired pursuant to such petition
may not be conveyed by the condemning authority or any other entity to a
natural person or private entity, by lease or otherwise, except that
ownership or control of property acquired pursuant to such petition may be
conveyed, by lease or otherwise, to a natural person or private entity.).
142. Id.
143. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 2-3 (stating in F.S. § 73.013(1)(a)-(h) [Exceptions]:
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a) For use in providing common carrier services or systems;
b) (1) For use as a road or other right-of-way or means that is open to the public
for transportation, whether at no charge or by toll;
(2) For use in the provision of transportation-related services, business
opportunities, and products pursuant to s. 338.234, on a toll road.
c) That is a public or private utility for use in providing electricity services or
systems, natural or manufactured gas services or systems, water and wastewater
services or systems, storm water or runoff services or systems, sewer services or
systems, pipeline facilities, telephone services or systems, or similar services or
systems;
d) For use in providing public infrastructure;
e) That occupies, pursuant to a lease, an incidental part of a public property or a
public facility for the purpose of providing goods or services to the public;
f) Without restriction, after public notice and competitive bidding unless
otherwise provided by general law, if less than 10 years have elapsed since the
condemning authority acquired title to the property and the following conditions
are met:
1. The condemning authority or governmental entity holding title to the
property documents that the property is no longer needed for the use or
purpose for which it was acquired by the condemning authority or for
which it was transferred to the current titleholder; and
2. The owner from whom the property was taken by eminent domain is
given the opportunity to repurchase the property at the price that he or she
received from the condemning authority;
g) After public notice and competitive bidding unless otherwise provide by
general law, if the property was owned and controlled by the condemning
authority or a governmental entity for at least 10 years after the condemning
authority acquired title to the property or
In accordance with subsection (2)
h) (2) (a) If ownership of property is conveyed to a natural person or private
entity pursuant to paragraph (1) (a), paragraph (1) (b), paragraph (1) (c),
paragraph (1) (d), or paragraph (1) (e), and at least 10 years have elapsed since
the condemning authority acquired title to the property, the property may
subsequently be transferred, after public notice and competitive bidding, unless
otherwise provided by general law, to another natural person or private entity
without restriction.
(b) If ownership of property is conveyed to a natural person or private entity
pursuant to paragraph (1) (a), paragraph (1) (b), paragraph (1) (c), paragraph (1)
(d), or paragraph (1) (e), and less than 10 years have elapsed since the
condemning authority acquired title to the property, the property may be
transferred, after public notice and competitive bidding unless otherwise
provided by general law, to another natural person or private entity without
restriction, if the following conditions are met:
1)The current titleholder documents that the property is no longer needed
for the use or purpose for which the property was transferred to the
current titleholder; and
2)The owner from whom the property was taken by eminent domain is
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governments to utilizing the taking power of eminent domain to
traditionally public use purposes such as roads, utilities, or government
infrastructure.144 However, the exceptions do not explicitly affect the
government‟s eminent domain powers provided under section 358.81(2)(j),
Florida Statutes, governing railroads and other public utilities.145
On the other hand, section 73.014 prohibits taking private property to
prevent or eliminate public nuisance, slum, or blight conditions146 by
specifically stating that nuisance, slum, and blight conditions do not satisfy
the public purpose standard and may not be used by a condemning
authority as a basis for eminent domain.147 However, the statute that
provides power to counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or
municipal ordinances related to code enforcement for the elimination of
public nuisance has not been diminished to the extent such ordinances do

given the opportunity to repurchase the property at the price that he or she
received from the condemning authority.
3)This section does not affect the limitation on a government entity‟s
power of eminent domain contained in s. 350.81 (2)(j).
4)The power of eminent domain shall be restricted as provided in this
chapter and chapters 127, 163, and 166, except when the owner of a
property relinquishes the property and concedes to the taking of the
property in order to retain the ability to reinvest the proceeds of the sale of
the property in replacement property under s. 1033 of the Internal
Revenue Code. These exceptions ensure that eminent domain is still
available for certain specified uses that the legislature has determined to
be of such importance that eminent domain proceedings can be
considered.)
144. FLA. STAT. § 70.013.
145. Id.
146. FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (prohibiting the taking of property to eliminate nuisance, slum
or blight conditions).
147. 2006-11 Fla. Laws 3-4 (stating at F.S. § 73.014(1) that “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, including any charter provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, the
state, any political subdivision as defined in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the
power of eminent domain is delegated may not exercise the power of eminent domain to
take private property for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision, ordinance,
statute, or special law, abating or eliminating a public nuisance is not a valid public purpose
or use for which private property may be taken by eminent domain and does not satisfy the
public purpose requirement of s. 6(a), Art. X of the State Constitution. This subsection does
not diminish the power of counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or municipal
ordinances related to code enforcement or the elimination of public nuisances to the extent
such ordinances do not authorize the taking of private property by eminent domain.”) This
statute appears to make it so that nuisance, blight or slum cannot be the express purposes of
taking a property. but I question whether or not this is so if the condemning authority finds
some other public purpose to go along with the nuisance, blight or slum conditions to justify
a taking.
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not authorize the taking of property through eminent domain.148 The new
sections, along with statutory notice provisions, combine to ostensibly
provide more property owners with additional protection from transfers of
private property to entities, and have eliminated some of the fears that
citizens held post Kelo lest the statutory revisions be deemed insufficient.
Florida legislators further created a political and substantive
safeguard. In addition to statutory revisions, the State House of
Representatives proposed Constitutional Amendment Eight, which
prohibited private property taken by eminent domain from being
transferred to a person or private entity except with a three-fifths vote of
the Legislature.149 The voters made their voices heard when sixty-nine
percent of voters approved the Amendment in the November 2006
election.150 This amendment changed article X, section 6, of the Florida
Constitution by adding subsection (c) as follows:
(c) Private property taken by eminent domain pursuant to a
petition to initiate condemnation proceedings filed on or after
January 2, 2007, may not be conveyed to a natural person or
private entity except as provided by general law passed by a
three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the
Legislature.151
Reading the eminent domain statutes and amended Florida
Constitution together, there are two requirements which must be met before
property taken by eminent domain can be conveyed to a private citizen or

148. NAT‟L ASS‟N OF INDUS. AND OFFICE PROPS. (NAIOP), EMINENT DOMAIN UPDATE 5
(Sept.
18,
2006),
available
at
http://www.naiop.org/governmentaffairs/issues/resources/eminentdomainupdate091806.pdf.
NAIOP is the nation‟s leading trade association for developers, owners, investors, asset
managers and other professionals in industrial, office and mixed-use commercial real estate.
Id. Founded in 1967, NAIOP comprises 13,000+ members in 50 North American chapters.
See also Paul D. Bain, 1999 amendments to Florida’s Eminent Domain Statutes, 73 FLA.
BAR
J.
68
(1999),
available
at
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/76d28aa8f2ee03e185256aa9005d8
d9a/1a5bcd7ceb307ec285256adb005d62a6?OpenDocument
(discussing the Florida
legislature‟s intent to impact litigation in eminent domain with the 1999 amendments).
149. H.R.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
150. Weimar, supra note 125.
151. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full
compensation therefore paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry
of the court and available to the owner.
(b) Provision may be made by law for the taking of easements, by like
proceedings, for the drainage of the land of one person over or through the land
of another.
Id.
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entity. First, ten years must pass from when the taking occurs,152 and
second, three-fifths of both legislative houses must approve the transfer.153
The requirement of this three-fifths vote is more symbolic than it is a real
obstacle to preventing elected officials from taking private property via
eminent domain and handing it over to private developers.154 As Professor
Dana stated, “[o]nly Florida has opted for the across-the-board approach
that Justice Thomas advocated for in his Kelo dissent, and in so doing,
Florida has out-done even the proposals of ideologically charged property
rights advocacy groups such as the Castle Coalition.”155
Is this the proverbial “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” or a
well thought-out, empirical statute with which to uphold the rights of the
people? Is this a protective law against the tyranny of government or a big
corporate political smoke screen? Has the law been revised in such a way
as to destroy its own objective? By analogy, one way to prevent auto
accidents is to flatly ban driving. Few would argue that this would not
eliminate auto accidents, however, the question would be, at what social
cost? That is the question presented by the Florida Legislation—sure, it
will protect homeowners from having their property taken for use by
private developers, but at what social cost? Where is the cost benefit
analysis? Should this be handled on a case by case basis and without the
burdensome process of additional legislative action? As we will see in the
next section, the restraints Florida adopted can cripple desperate
government entities in their quest to revitalize their communities.
V.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: IMPACT OF FLORIDA‟S REACTION TO
KELO

In the rush to enact laws narrowing the allowable purposes for
eminent domain proceedings, Florida‟s lawmakers may have overlooked
the negative impact on counties, towns, and municipalities which rely on
lawful takings to modernize their urban areas, attract financing and
industries, and increase tax bases. Florida‟s all out ban on both economic
and blight condemnation was a hasty legislative reaction to Kelo.156 The
statutory amendments cured the pernicious act of governmental takings of
152. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(a) (2006).
153. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c).
154. Id. Three-fifths is the equivalent of sixty percent as opposed to fifty percent. Id.
155. Dana, supra note 62, at 375−76. The Castle Coalition is a grassroots organization
founded in March 2002 as a project of the Institute for Justice (IJ), a public-interest law firm
in Washington, D.C. CASTLE COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org (last visited Jan.
30, 2011). The organization helps teach business owners and homeowners how to fight
eminent domain cases. Id.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2006) (“[t]aking property to eliminate nuisance, slum or
blight conditions prohibited”).
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private property from one citizen and conveying it to another who promises
to make “better use” of the property. While laudable on its face, this flat
prohibition eliminates a legitimate tool of municipalities to better serve all
residents, albeit at the expense of a few affected homeowners. In this
regard, the result is similar to takings for the public good that
inconvenience private property owners for traditional purposes such as
schools, libraries, railroads, roads, utility easements, and so forth.157 The
legislature needs to balance the ability of counties and municipalities to
attract new developments and overcome blight, while retaining appropriate
safeguards to protect against abuse.158
Prior to Kelo, local redevelopment efforts in Florida were governed by
and should have been aligned with the Community Redevelopment Act of
1969, codified under Chapter 163, Part III, Florida Statutes.159 When the
Florida Legislature adopted the Act, it stated its intent as follows:
[T]here exist in counties and municipalities of the state slum and
blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace,
injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of the
residents of the state; that the existence of such areas . . .
constitutes an economic and social liability imposing onerous
burdens which decrease the tax base and reduce tax revenues,
substantially impairs or arrests sound growth . . . aggravates
traffic problems, and substantially hampers the elimination of
traffic hazards and the improvement of traffic facilities; and that
the prevention and elimination of slums and blight is a matter of
state policy and state concern . . . . 160
The Act permitted economic development by public entities in order
to eliminate or prevent “slums” or “blight.”161 Each local government
(county or municipality) could establish a Community Redevelopment
Agency (“CRA”) to exercise the community redevelopment authority after
a “finding of necessity,”162 and a further finding of the “need for a CRA to

157. See SPRINGER, 119, at 9 (advising that “broad prohibitions” on eminent domain
“could preclude communities from revitalizing, creating jobs, and condemning blighted
properties”).
158. See Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Seeks ‘Least Worst’ Path, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471204575210102200492256.html
(illustrating the struggles of municipalities attempting to restructure under the bankruptcy
code).
159. See Community Redevelopment Act of 1969, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.330-163.463
(2006) (providing for community redevelopment agencies to minimize slums and blight).
160. FLA. STAT. § 163.335(1) (2006).
161. FLA. STAT. § 163.340 (2006).
162. FLA. STAT. § 163.355 (2006).
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carry out community redevelopment.”163 The condition in targeted areas
must be either a “slum”164 or “blight”165 in order for local government to

163. FLA. H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 1583, COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT 2 (2006),
available
at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/SEctions/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1583a.LG
C.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1583&Session=2006; see also FLA. STAT. §
163.370(2)(c) (2006) (giving counties and municipalities the necessary powers “to
undertake and carry out community development and related activities”).
164. FLA. STAT. § 163.340(7) (2006) (“„Slum area‟ means an area having physical or
economic conditions conducive to disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, poverty,
or crime because there is a predominance of buildings or improvements, whether residential
or nonresidential, which are impaired by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age, or
obsolescence, and exhibiting one or more of the following factors:
(a) Inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open spaces;
(b) High density of population, compared to the population density of adjacent
areas within the county or municipality; and overcrowding, as indicated by
government-maintained statistics or other studies and the requirements of the
Florida Building Code; or
(c) The existence of conditions that endanger life or property by fire or other
causes”).
165. FLA. STAT. § 163.340(8) (2006) (“„Blighted area‟ means an area in which there are
a substantial number of deteriorated, or deteriorating structures, in which conditions, as
indicated by government-maintained statistics or other studies, are leading to economic
distress or endanger life or property, and in which two or more of the factors are present:
(a) Predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, parking facilities,
roadways, bridge, or public transportation facilities;
(b) Aggregate assessed values of real property in the area of ad valorem tax
purposes have failed to show any appreciable increase over the 5 years prior to
the finding of such conditions;
(c) Faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness;
(d) unsanitary or unsafe conditions;
(e) Deterioration of site or other improvements;
(f) Inadequate and outdated building density patterns;
(g) Falling lease rates per square foot of office, commercial, or industrial space
compared to the remainder of the county or municipality;
(h) Tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land;
(i) Residential and commercial vacancy rates higher in the area than in the
remainder of the county or municipality;
(j) Incidence of crime in the area higher than in the remainder of the county or
municipality;
(k) Fire and emergency medical service calls to the area proportionately higher
than in the remainder of the county or municipality;
(l) A greater number of violations of the Florida Building Code in the area than
the number of violations recorded in the remainder of the county or
municipality;
(m) Diversity of ownership or defective or unusual conditions of title which
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exercise the power of eminent domain.
The CRA executed the community redevelopment plan proposed by a
county‟s or municipality‟s governing body, which sometimes consisted of
only five members.166 The redevelopment plan must have been in harmony
with the local government‟s comprehensive plan before the municipality
could adopt and follow it.167 Once the redevelopment plan was adopted,
the counties, municipalities, and redevelopment agencies had the power of
eminent domain to effectuate the purpose of the CRA.168 Therefore, local
governments could have “acquire[d] by condemnation any interest in real
property, including a fee simple title thereto, which it deem[ed] necessary
for, or in connection with, community redevelopment and related activities
under this part.”169 Under section 163.340(8), Florida Statutes, an area can
be considered blighted, and subject to condemnation and private
redevelopment, if it meets only two of the fourteen criteria.170
Post-Kelo statutes, with their new bright-line rules and limited
exceptions, drastically reduce local governments‟ flexibility in meeting the
goals of the Community Redevelopment Act.171
The Community
Redevelopment Act was amended to remove the power of eminent domain
prevent the free alienability of land within the deteriorated or hazardous area; or
(n) Governmentally owned property with adverse environmental conditions
caused by a public or private entity. However the term “blighted area” also
means any area in which at least one of the factors identified in paragraphs (a)
through (n) are present and all taxing authorities subject to s. 163.387 (2) (a)
agree, either by interlocal agreement or agreements with the agency or by
resolution, that the area is blighted. Such agreement or resolution shall only
determine that the area is blighted. For purposes of qualifying for the tax
credits authorized in chapter 220, “blighted area” means an area as defined in
this subsection”).
166. See FLA. STAT. § 163.356 (2006) (resolving that the board of a CRA shall have no
fewer than five and no more than nine members).
167. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3167, .3184, .3187, .3189, .3191, .3194 (2006)
(describing the guidelines and procedures for adopting, amending, and evaluating
comprehensive plans).
168. See FLA. STAT. § 163.375 (1999) (repealed 2006) (defining the exercise of the
power of eminent domain).
169. FLA. STAT. § 163.375(1)−(3); see generally FLA. STAT. §§ 163.358 (2006) (defining
powers of local governments in effecting community redevelopment and related activities),
§ 73-74 (West Supp. 2009) (describing eminent domain and proceedings supplemental to
eminent domain), § 127.01-.02 (2000) (limiting the rights of counties to exercise eminent
domain).
170. See FLA. STAT. § 163.340(8) (2006) (defining “blighted area” by listing factors such
as “inadequate and outdated building density patterns,” a “predominance of defective or
inadequate street layout,” an “incidence of crime in the area higher than in the remainder of
the county or municipality,” and falling lease rates per square foot of office, commercial, or
industrial space compared to the remainder of the county or municipality).
171. FLA. STAT. § 163.370 (2006) (deleting authority to delegate the power of eminent
domain to a community redevelopment agency).
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from the community redevelopment agencies.172 However, governments
can still transfer condemned land to a natural person or private entity, but
only after holding the property for a period of “at least ten years [after] . . .
acquir[ing] title.”173 Most significantly, the new law makes it clear that
local governments may only utilize the taking power in the context of uses
which have been held to be traditionally valid public purposes in prior
exercises of eminent domain or takings. The amendments to Chapter 73
expressly state that the “[taking of] private property for . . . eliminating a
public nuisance. . . . slum, or blight condition[] . . . does not satisfy the
public-purpose requirement of s[ection] 6(a), Art. X of the State
Constitution.”174
As explained above, prior to Kelo, Florida law simply required that
there be a valid public purpose in order to exercise eminent domain over
private property. The 2006 amended legislation added a specific exclusion
for slum eradication as a basis for condemning property through eminent
domain, and further added safeguards to prevent municipalities from using
eminent domain to take property and transfer it to private developers for
economic improvements175 or blight remediation.176
The purpose of governmental regulation may be to correct a problem.
However, legislative bodies often fail to consider the law of unintended
consequences, which is the principle that for every law or policy that is
implemented with a set of objectives or goals in mind, there are always one
or more unintended consequences that will stem from that law or policy.177

172. See FLA. STAT. § 163.358(6) (2006) (reserving the power of eminent domain to the
governing body of the county or municipality); see also H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg. § 9 (Fla.
2006) (amending § 163.368).
173. FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (West Supp. 2009); see also H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg. (Fla. 2006)
(amending Florida state codes regarding eminent domain); H.R.J. Res. 1569, 2006 Leg.
(Fla. 2006) (amending the Florida State Constitution prohibiting transfer of property taken
by eminent domain to a natural person or private entity, with exceptions to be enacted by
legislature).
174. H.B. 1567 § 1, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Fla. 2006); see also David Parkhurst, Senate
Passes Eminent Domain Amendment, NAT‟L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Oct. 24, 2005),
http://www.nlc.org/Newsroom/Nation_s_Cities_Weekly_v2/Weekly_NCW/2005_v2/10_v3
/24_v6/6787.aspx (reporting in 2006 that the U.S. Senate adopted an amendment to an
appropriation bill permitting states and cities to use federal funds for projects using eminent
domain for a public use).
175. See FLA. STAT. § 163.335(7) (2006).
176. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (West Supp. 2009) (prohibiting the taking of
private property “for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions” and
thus acknowledging that slum and blight are no longer recognized as valid public purposes
for the taking of private property in Florida).
177. See Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html (last visited
February 3, 2011) (providing a definition and discussion of the concept of “unintended
consequences”); see also Richard J. Grant, Government Interference Led to Financial
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While the Florida Legislature quickly enacted laws to correct a perceived
problem, namely Kelo-type takings, it neglected to consider that its
legislation could have side effects that overshadow the benefits.178
A.

Impact on Credit Markets and Financing

One such side effect, for example, is the possible impact on a local
government‟s ability to attract or maintain standing in the credit markets.
Limiting eminent domain powers may have negative credit implications for
local government.179 A special report released by Fitch Ratings180
expressed concerns that “if eminent domain powers are restricted to a
significant degree, municipal credit quality could be restrained or
negatively affected. . . . By impairing a state or local government‟s efforts
towards economic development, such legislation, if enacted, may limit
opportunities for credit quality improvement and rating upgrades.”181 The
report further indicates, “restrictive legislation has the potential to
contribute to a diminution of credit quality over a longer term, in that, the
proposed laws limit a state or local government‟s ability to respond to
economic blight or weakened conditions.”182 Specifically, “the impact of
restrictive legislation mostly will affect development-reliant credit types,
such as tax allocation bonds, special assessment debt and [structured]
obligations . . . , and, [in the long run,] impact both development-related
debt and broader-based securities issued by the municipality, such as

Crisis,
RICHARDJGRANT.COM
BLOG,
Jan.
10,
2010,
3:28
PM,
http://richardgrant.blogspot.com/2010/01/government-interference-led-to.html
(“A
government regulatory action that directly contributed to the recent financial crisis was the
Community Reinvestment Act. This act created an arbitrary, race-based standard for
judging banks‟ lending practices. As a result, banks could be sued for discrimination if they
did not lend to minorities in numbers that the regulatory authorities determined to be
sufficient. . . . [The lowering of bank lending standards led to the growth of the subprime
market,] as did the risk for default.”).
178. See generally Grant, supra note 177 (describing various instances of government
financial regulations producing unintended consequences).
179. Fitch: Eminent Domain Restrictions Affect on Muni Credit Quality, THE FREE
LIBRARY
BY
FARLEX,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fitch%3a+Eminent+Domain+Restrictions+Affect+on+Muni
+Credit+Quality.-a0142626776 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
180. Fitch Ratings is a leading global credit rating agency committed to providing the
world‟s credit markets with independent, timely and prospective credit opinions. Built on a
foundation of organic growth and strategic acquisitions, Fitch Ratings has grown rapidly
during the past decade gaining market presence throughout the world and across all fixed
income
markets.
See
Overview,
FITCH
RATINGS,
http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/creditdesk/AboutFitch.faces?context=1&detail=1
(last
visited February 15, 2011).
181. Fitch: Eminent Domain Restrictions Affect on Muni Credit Quality, supra note 179.
182. Id.
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general obligation bonds, lease obligations, and utility revenue bonds.”183
From an economic standpoint, local government is faced with many
decisions on how to best meet the economic environment of its citizens and
the community. Prior to Kelo, a CRA could declare an area or a
neighborhood to be slum or blighted and exercise the power of eminent
domain to clear the property.184 The seized property would be marshaled
into an economically advantageous tract and offered to a private developer
to redevelop in accordance with a CRA adopted redevelopment plan.185
The private developer was rewarded by gaining the value of the increased
tax base as security for a municipal bond, which would underwrite the
infrastructure cost of a new private development and by obtaining an
assembled tract at a price below what it would have cost as individual
parcels.186 Under the CRA, it was foreseeable that a developer would not
need to invest in the infrastructure because these costs may already have
been paid for by bond funds procured by the area‟s projected increase in
taxable value.187
States, counties, and municipalities may issue municipal bonds to
finance the necessary infrastructure to develop or redevelop localities and
to finance general public-purpose projects such as roads, bridges, utilities,
and airports.188 As a result, the cost will be spread over a fixed period of
years until the bonds mature and the costs are shared by all those who
benefit from the development or redevelopment of the project.189
Therefore, haste on the part of Florida lawmakers in enacting legislation to
correct one problem—the prevention of Kelo-type takings—may have
created unintended consequences that increase the economic cost for

183. Id.
184. FLA STAT. § 163.340(8) (2006).
185. S. William Moore, “Blight” as a Means of Justifying Condemnation for Economic
Redevelopment in Florida, 35 STETSON L. REV. 443, 444-45 (2006).
186. Id. at 445.
187. See generally id. at 446, 451, 457. In Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”), when the
property tax value in the redevelopment area rises above property values in the base year the
redevelopment area was created, increment revenues are generated by applying the current
millage rate levied by taxing authority in the area to the increase in value. That increase
value or increment revenue is deposited in a CRA trust fund. These revenues are used to
service bonds issued to finance redevelopment project. Instead of taking the blighted
property through eminent domain, this is another method of funding used for redeveloping
blighted areas under the CRA. However, CRAs are not typically overseen by the state since
all the monies used in financing CRA activities are locally generated. See also FLA.
REDEVELOPMENT ASS‟N (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.redevelopment.net/crafq.aspx (FRA is
a non-profit organization assisting those in Florida revitalization efforts).
188. See also TALBOT D‟ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 109-11 (1991) (commenting on art. VII, §§ 10 and 11 of the Florida Constitution
regarding proper uses for proceeds from extension of government credit).
189. Id.
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private developers redeveloping blighted communities. For example, in
light of our economic crisis, the market price for municipal bonds may vary
with the changes in interest rates. An increase in the interest rate may lead
to lower bond prices, and the bonds may be at risk if they are not held to
maturity.190 This may discourage potential bond purchasers due to fear of
loss or failure to pay back the money borrowed.191 Similarly, the private
developers may not get the benefit of the municipal bond to underwrite the
cost of the infrastructure and funding redevelopment plans.192
B.

Impact on Legitimate Efforts to Eradicate Blight

In addition, did the Legislature consider the cost to local government
of resorting to alternative means to clean up or eliminate blighted areas?
Since the Act‟s “blighted area” test was eliminated as a basis for local
governments to take private property through eminent domain,193 blight
condemnation is no longer considered a valid public purpose or use for
which property may be taken.194 Municipalities and counties now have to
resort to adopting or enforcing local ordinances related to code
enforcement for the elimination of public nuisance, provided the ordinance
does not authorize the taking of private property by eminent domain.195
This can lead to increased expenses due to enforcement action and may
never result in a permanent solution if the property owner is simply unable
to afford eliminating the condition.
With the implementation of Chapter 73, “local government will no
longer be able to delegate their condemnation powers to community
redevelopment agencies, and CRAs will only be able to acquire property
for redevelopment through voluntary methods.”196 Therefore, property

190. Fitch: Eminent Domain Restrictions Affect on Muni Credit Quality, supra note 182.
191. Id.
192. Moore, supra note 185, at 452.
193. See Mark Bentley, Hurricane Kelo Hits Florida, FLORIDAEMINENTDOMAIN.COM,
http://www.floridaeminentdomain.com/images/Article-Hurricane_Kelo_Hits_Florida.pdf
(2007) (describing amendment of Florida statutes to remove blight as an acceptable reason
for public takings); see also FLA. STAT. §73.014 (stating that the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised to take private property for the purpose of abating or eliminating a
public nuisance).
194. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
195. FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2006).
196. Mark Riso & Mandy Hagan, Eminent Domain Update, NAT‟L. ASS‟N. INDUS. &
OFFICE
PROPS.,
at
5
(Sept.
16,
2006),
http://www.naiop.org/governmentaffairs/issues/resources/eminentdomainupdate091806.pdf.
NAIOP is the nation‟s leading trade association for developers, owners, investors, asset
managers and other professionals in industrial, office and mixed-use commercial real estate.
Founded in 1967, NAIOP comprises over 13,000 members in fifty North American
chapters. Id.; see also Paul D. Bain, 1999 Amendments to Florida’s Eminent Domain
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acquired by the CRA is now subject to a ten-year holding period, during
which time the transfer of the property to a natural person or private entity
is prohibited.197 The impact of this timetable, especially as it relates to
holding cost and opportunity cost, is that cities may miss out on an
opportunity to attract new business ventures that are ready, willing, and
able to begin construction. Only under certain limited conditions, and after
public notice and competitive bidding, may condemned property be
transferred before the statutory ten years have elapsed, without
restrictions.198 If a city takes property by eminent domain and immediately
transfers it to a private party, the city may collect revenue during the ten
years it would otherwise be required to “hold” the taken property, which
could, depending on the property, be a significant amount of revenue. How
much opportunity cost does the waiting period create? The chance to
redevelop at a lower-than-normal cost may be lost while waiting for the
mandated time period to elapse.
In addition to the ten-year waiting period, local governments must
address article X, § 6(c), which prohibits the transfer of ownership or
control of private property taken by eminent domain to any natural person
or private entity unless authorized by general law passed by three-fifths
vote of each house of the Legislature.199 This requirement will result in
significant additional cost to the political subdivision in the form of
attorneys‟ fees, lobbying expenses, and time, as the House and Senate meet
for only a sixty-day period each year. In difficult economic times, and
dealing with the declining tax bases that always accompany blighted areas,
the combined restrictions impose what may amount to an unreasonable

Statutes,
73
FLA.
BAR
J.
10,
68
(1999)
available
at
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/76d28aa8f2ee03e185256aa9005d8
d9a/1a5bcd7ceb307ec285256adb005d62a6?OpenDocument (stating that new amendments
to Florida‟s eminent domain laws require pre-suit negotiations in eminent domain
litigations).
197. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(1)(f) (2006).
198. FLA. STAT. § 73.013(2)(b) (2006).
If ownership of property is conveyed to a natural person or private entity . . .
and less than 10 years have elapsed since the condemning authority acquired
title to the property, the property may be transferred, after public notice and
competitive bidding unless otherwise provided by general law, to another
natural person or private entity without restriction, if the following conditions
are met: 1. The current titleholder documents that the property is no longer
needed for the use or purpose for which the property was transferred to the
current titleholder; and 2. The owner from whom the property was taken by
eminent domain is given the opportunity to repurchase the property at the price
that he or she received from the condemning authority.
Id.
199. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c).

CAVAZOSFINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE)

720

4/28/2011 7:34 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 13:3

burden on local governments faced with troubled communities.200
VI. BRINGING IN THE SHEEP: A SOLUTION FOR GROWN AND
REDEVELOPMENT
The author‟s concern is not with Florida‟s critical evaluation of each
economic proposal, but with the summary fashion by which this
Legislation mandates rejection of all proposals involving private
development or use. Indeed, under this legislation, property previously
condemned and taken by the state could not be transferred to a private
citizen for economic development, even if the city has vacated the property,
unless the Legislature authorizes a general law passed by three-fifths vote
of each house. Needless to say, obtaining such approval from the
Legislature could delay projects to the point of dissuading developers from
pursuing them. The key is to balance the needs of local communities with
the desire to uphold private property rights. Partnerships between local
governments and private developers have proven to be the most successful
method of redevelopment.201 Therefore, I recommend that sections 73.013
and 73.014, Florida Statutes, and article X, § 6(c) of the Florida
Constitution, be amended to address the unintended consequences created
by the Legislature in attempting to rectify the effects of Kelo. The problem
created by the restrictive legislation could destroy the ability of
municipalities to attract new industry and generate revenue.
The first step that Florida‟s lawmakers should take is to amend the
eminent domain statute to allow partnerships between local government
and private developers. The legislative response to Kelo was a craven
political reaction designed to quell constituent concerns rather than a
reasoned practical solution that serves the best interest of Floridians. The
term “public purpose” has as many definitions as “affirmative action.” Just
as affirmative action is viewed by some as code for quotas and hiring of
incompetents to fulfill quotas, post-Kelo public purpose is viewed as a code
for the government taking the property of one private citizen to give to
another private party who promises to make better use of the property. In
both cases, the concerns are unfounded mischaracterizations of the terms.
Yet politicians know that voters cast their ballots based on their perceptions
of the information even if their perceptions are inaccurate or misleading.
Sections 73.013 and 73.014, Florida Statutes, are overly restrictive, as is
article X, section 6(c) of the Florida Constitution. An analysis of the facts
200. See FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2006) (creating additional hurdles for local governments
in the transfer of properties acquired under eminent domain).
201. Francesca Jarosz, Before You Grab That Property . . . States Take A Close Look at
Eminent
Domain,
BUS.
L.
TODAY,
Jan.-Feb.
2007,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-01-02/jarosz.shtml.
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in Kelo shows that the property in question was first condemned because it
was viewed as a depressed municipality. This part of the decision is
generally not in dispute. Indeed, if the designation of the property as
depressed was an error, the Court would have sustained the finding or
remanded for a redetermination. The critical issue in Kelo is whether the
condemning authority was authorized to turn the property over to private
developers.202
To ensure that struggling local governments have all the tools they
need to fight economic decline in their communities, I propose to repeal the
blanket restriction on transferring property taken by eminent domain to
private developers and to replace it with a provision that provides
protection for the citizen if the economic benefits are not forthcoming after
a reasonable time. For instance, the Act should provide for returning the
property to the state if, after five years, the projected economic benefits to
the municipality have not occurred. Many of the negative impacts explored
in Section IV above can be overcome by providing local governments the
authority to partner with private developers in implementing a plan in
accordance with a carefully legislated CRA.
The law should also contain provisions to prevent abuse. I suggest
establishing a state administrative agency of economic development with
powers to promulgate rules, regulations, and guidelines for approving
partnerships between local government and private developers when
eminent domain is one of the tools employed. Such rules and regulations
should be adopted pursuant to the Florida Administrative Procedures Act,
with public participation through notice and comment. This would remove
decisions from politicians, whose goal is re-election rather than the best
interest of the state, and place the decision with an administrative agency
that is somewhat insulated from political pressure.
The solution described above offers a compromise between pre- and
post-Kelo extremes. It would return to local governments their most
valuable tool for redevelopment while not encouraging overzealous takings
in the quest to alleviate blight and ensure vibrant local communities for
years to come.

202. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (challenging city‟s exercise
of eminent domain power on grounds that takings were not for public use).

